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Case No. 20150681-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of W.E.M.,

a person under 18 years of age.
W.E.M.,
Appellant,

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
W.E.M. appeals from an adjudication for assault against a school
employee.

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-

103(2)(c).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
W.E.M. and his friends had been pushing one another into other
students as they walked the halls of their junior high school. One morning
when W.E.M.'s friend pushed him, W.E.M. lowered his shoulder before
crashing into an assistant principal.

1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish that W.E.M. assaulted a

school employee with knowledge that she was a school employee?
2.

If not, was the evidence sufficient to establish that W.E.M.

committed a simple assault?

Standard of Review for Issues 1 & 2. This Court reviews challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence under the dear-error standard. In re Z.D.,
t''',
\;j;)il

2006 UT 54,

,r,r 28-29, 147 P.3d 401.

Under that standard, this Court may

reverse only if, giving "due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses," Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), it determines
that the finding is "against the clear weight of the evidence" or this Court
"otherwise reaches a definite and £inn conviction that a 1nistake has been
made," In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54,

,r 32

(internal quotation marks omitted).

However, this Court reviews for correctness any legal conclusions
undergirding the juvenile court's findings. See In re C.C., 2013 UT 26,

,r 12,

301 P.3d 1000.

3.

Should the Court second-guess the decision whether to refer

W.E.M. to juvenile court and to proceed with an adjudication for assault
against a school employee?

Standard of Review. Determining the availability of relief based on the
discretionary decisions of a peace offic_er or prosecutor presents an" abstract
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1fu;

legal question[]" that is reviewed for correctness. See In re Adoption of Baby
B., 2012 UT 35,

,r 41, 308 P.3d 382 (discussing general standards of review).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103 (West 2015) (mental states);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004) (simple assault); and
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.3 (West 2015) (assault against school
employees).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State filed a petition on March 6, 2015, alleging that W.E.M.
assaulted a school employee, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if
committed by an adult. Rl-2; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.3 (West 2015).
Following a hearing on July 31, 2015, the juvenile court adjudicated W.E.M.
as has having committed the offense and thus falling within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court. R51.
The assault allegation arose from a December 9, 2014 incident. R1.
But the context of that incident stretched back several weeks. R56:97. Sherri
Branch, an assistant principal at Eisenhower Junior High, heard "multiple
reports" that W.E.M. and others had been "shoulder checking" other
students in the halls of the school.

R56:82-83, 94-95, 97.

As W.E.M.' s

friend, K.J ., described it, one of them would bump into the other, and the
second person would then bump into a non-participant in the hall. R56:27-
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28. W.E.M. said they only did it to friends, R56:71-75, but K.J. said they

were "just kind of doing it to random people," R56:29, 34. Although W.E.M.
described their actions as "just ... 1nessing around," R56:73, and K.J.
described it as "just goofing off," R56:28, W.E.M. acknowledged that he was
aware people could get hurt as a result of their actions, R56:72-73, 75.
In response to the reports of shoulder checking, Branch confronted
W.E.M. and warned him stop. R56:99-100. She also increased patrols of the
hallways. R56:96.
Brenda Zimmerman, who was interning as an assistant principal, was
on one such patrol with another teacher in the minutes before school started
on the morning of December 9. R56:10, 13. The halls were quite crowded.
R56:16. Zimmerman turned the corner from C-Hall and headed west down

B-Hall. R56:12. W.E.M. and K.J. were in B-Hall, headed east toward C-Hall,
and they had been pushing each other. 1 R56:29, 32-33, 35. K.J. pushed
W.E.M. and, in one fluid motion as he passed Zimmerman, W.E.M. lowered
his left shoulder and hit Zimmerman in her left shoulder. R56:10, 15. The

1

W.E.M. testified that he had not pushed anyone that day. R56:64.
But K.J. indicated that W.E.M. had been pushing him earlier that morning.
R56:32 ("We're doing it in other halls too but right here it was me bumping
into W.").
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blow knocked Zimmerman off balance and "hurt like it would hurt when
someone hits your arm hard." R56:11. Zimmennan "looked back to 1nake
sure [she] knew who did that," but continued down the hall, where she saw
the principal and reported the incident. R56:11, 15, 23. A short time later
she reported to Branch, her immediate supervisor, that W.E.M. had
"shoulder checked" her. R56:84-85.
W.E.M. said he "turned around to see who it was" and was

embarrassed when he saw Zimmerman, but he and K.J. continued down the
hall. R56:35-36, 65-66. Soon after, K.J. pushed W.E.M. again and W.E.M.
lost his balance. R56:50, 66. As a school resource officer described it based
on a surveillance video, W.E.M.

0

took a stumble like he tripped over his

foot," colliding with another student on the other side of the hall. R56:50,
52.

W.E.M. knew who Zhnmerman was from prior interactions the two

had had in her capacity as an administrator.

R56:15-16.

Although

Zimmerman could not recall how long after she rounded the corner W.E.M.
shoulder checked her, R56:12, and although W.E.M. testified that he did not
see Zimmerman until he collided with her, R56:65, the two were facing each
other as they headed opposite directions down the hall and W.E.M. would
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have had the opportunity to see Zimmerman, even if only briefly-just as
she saw him "walking towards [her]," R56:10-12, 35.
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court determined that the State
had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that W.E.M. had assaulted a school
employee. RSl-52; R56:115-18. The court imposed a suspended five-day
term of detention, ordered W.E.M. to serve twenty hours of compensatory
service, and ordered him to write a letter of apology to Zimmerman. RSl52; R56:117-18.

W.E.M. timely appealed. R54.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
W.E.M. raises a nu1nber of issues in his opening brief, but this appeal
is at heart a dispute about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
W.E.M.' s adjudication.

He argues that the evidence was insufficient

because (1) he was pushed and thus hit Zimmennan accidentally, not
voluntarily, (2) he did not know he hit Zin1merman until after he hit her,
and (3) he did not target Zimmennan.
The last assertion conflicts with the statute's plain language.

The

statute requires only that a person committing an assault knows that the
victhn is a school employee at the time of the assault. It does not require
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proof that the assailant targeted the victhn for an assault based on her status
as a school employee.
Here, the evidence supports the actual elements of assault of a school
employee: W.E.M. voluntarily shoulder checked his victim, and he knew he
was shoulder checking Zimmerman, whom he ad1nitted he knew was a
school employee.

The juvenile court could reasonably draw these

inferences because W.E.M. lowered his shoulder as he crashed into
Zimmerman in one fluid motion, W.E.M. and Zimmerman were face-to-face
before the assault, and Zhnmerman was able to see W.E.M. before he
shoulder checked her. Furthermore, the juvenile court implicitly rejected
W.E.M.'s testimony that he did not see Zimmerman beforehand.

Such

credibility determinations are given particular deference on appeal. When
viewed with the appropriate level of deference to the juvenile court, the
evidence was sufficient for the court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that W.E.M. assaulted a school employee with knowledge of the victim's
status.
However, if this Court disagrees, it should remand for entry of an
adjudication for assault, for by W.E.M.' s own admission, he acted with
awareness of the risk that bodily injury could result fr01n his actions and he
thus had the requisite 1nental state for the lesser-included offense of assault.
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W.E.M. also takes issue with the referral of his case to juvenile court.
But that decision is within the discretion of the referring officer. W.E.M.
does not allege any procedural error in the referral and adjudication of his
case. Because the evidence supports the conclusion that the juvenile court
has jurisdiction over W.E.M.-whether due to his commission of assault
against a school employee or its lesser-included offense-W.E.M.'s policy
arguments challenging his referral to juvenile court are unpersuasive and
beside the point.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INFERENCE THAT
W.E.M. SAW THE SCHOOL EMPLOYEE AND
VOLUNTARILY SHOULDER CHECKED HER, THUS
SUPPORTING THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING
THAT HE KNOWINGLY ASSAULTED A SCHOOL
EMPLOYEE.
W.E.M. argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove
assault of a school employee because, he says, it did not prove (1) that he
cmnmitted a voluntary act when he hit Zimmerman, and (2) that he knew
he was hitting Zimmerman until it was too late. 2 W.E.M. also argues that

2

W.E.M. does not challenge any other element of the statute,
including that Zimmerman was a school employee, that she was acting
within the scope of her duties at the time of the incident, and that she
(... continued on next page)

-8-

the statute required the State to prove that he targeted Zimmerman for the
assault based on her status as a school ern.ployee, and the evidence failed to
prove that.
But the evidence sl)owed that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder then
crashed into Zimmerman in one fluid motion. From this, the juvenile court
could reject his contention that he was involuntarily pushed into
Zimmerman and could infer that he voluntarily participated in shoulder
checking her. The evidence was also sufficient for the court to find that
W.E.M. knew he was hitting Zimmerman: They were face-to-face at the
time he assaulted her and W.E.M. had an opportunity to see Zimmerman
before he shoulder checked her.

And the statute does not require

intentional targeting of a school employee; rather, it requires only that a
person commit an assault knowing that the victim is a school employee.
The evidence supports that finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 3

suffered bodily injury as a result. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.3. In fact,
W.E.M. does not even dispute that he knew Zimmerman was a school
employee.
3

W.E.M. also argues that "[n]owhere did the juvenile court address
the evidence in light of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden." Aplt. Br. at
30. In fact, the juvenile court began the announcement of its ruling by
stating, "I find the following has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
R56:116. The court reiterated that standard in its written order. R51. To the
(... continued on next page)
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A. Evidence that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder and
crashed into the school employee in one fluid motion
provided a basis for the juvenile court to reasonably
conclude that W.E.M. voluntarily hit the school
employee.
W.E.M. argues that it was all an accident-that he did not voluntarily
hit Zhnmerman because his friend pushed him into her. Aplt. Br. at 13, 2728. But the evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that W.E.M.
voluntarily participated in a shoulder-checking assault.
Zimmerman testified that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder then crashed
into her in a single fluid motion. R56:10, 15. It was reasonable for the
juvenile court to infer that the lowering of the shoulder was a voluntary act.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(1) (West 2015) ("' Act' means a voluntary
bodily movement and includes speech."). And it was reasonable to infer

extent W.E.M. is arguing that the law required the juvenile court to do
something more to demonstrate that it applied the proper standard, W.E.M.
never brought that argument to the juvenile court's attention. R56:115-19.
Therefore, this Court should not address it. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat,
Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 51, 99 P.3d 801 ("Issues that are not raised at trial are
usually deen1ed waived."). To the extent W.E.M. is silnply arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to establish the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard, that issue is properly before the Court. Cf In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54,
ir 27 (noting that the burden of proof is relevant to appellate review of a
lower court's findings, but that it is "subordinate to the standard of review
set out in rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure").

-10-

that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder in preparation for the shoulder check, and
thus to reject his contention that he was pushed into her involuntarily.
Furthermore, W.E.M.'s own witness testified that W.E.M. had been
involved in "multiple" prior incidents of shoulder checking in the halls.
R56:83, 94-95, 97.

W.E.M.' s prior participation in actively shoulder

checking others makes it less likely that this occasion of shoulder checking
was accidental. "An innocent person may be falsely accused or suffer an
unfortunate accident, but when several independent accusations arise or
multiple similar 'accidents' occur, the objective probability that the accused
innocently suffered such unfortunate coincidences decreases."

State v.

Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I 49, 296 P.3d 673; see also State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5,

,r,I 29-31,

318 P.3d 1151 (explaining that "the repetition of several

distinctively similar acts" makes it less likely as a 1natter of logic that the act
in question was accidental). Zimmerman's description of W.E.M.' s action to
her supervisor-" shoulder checked" -suggests a voluntary act.

R56:84.

That description is qualitatively different from the school resource officer's
description of W.E.M's subsequent accidental collision with another
student- "he took a stumble like he tripped over his foot."

R56:50.

W.E.M.' s multiple prior incidents of shoulder checking thus reinforce the
juvenile court's inference that the present incident was not accidental.
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While the juvenile court could have drawn contrary inferences from
the evidence, the evidence did not clearly weigh against the inference the
court did draw:

that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

W.E.M. voluntarily shoulder checked Zimmerman. See Edwards v. Powder

Mountain Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App 185,

,r 25, 214 P.3d 120 (stating that

an appellate court "1nust uphold a trial court's factual findings ... unless
the evidence clearly weighs against such findings"). 4

B. A juvenile need not target a school employee to be
adjudicated of assaulting a school employee; it is
enough if he knows at the time of the assault that his
victim is a school employee.
W.E.M. argues that he should not have been adjudicated of assault of
a school en1ployee because "there was no evidence that" he "targeted Ms.
Zhnmerman" or even had any "intended targets at all." Aplt. Br. at 22, 25.
He asserts that interpreting the statute to require proof of intentional
targeting is required because the statute creates a special privilege for school

4

W.E.M. also argues that the evidence was insufficient under an
accomplice theory because he lacked the requisite 1nental state and did not
solicit, request, cmnmand, encourage, or intentionally aid K.J. in assaulting
a school employee. Aplt. Br. at 25-27. Although the prosecutor argued an
accomplice theory below, R56:61, 105, the juvenile court did not rely on that
theory in its ruling, R56:115-17. And as discussed above, the evidence was
sufficient to support the conclusion that W.E.M. acted as a principal.
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employees and therefore must be strictly construed in his favor. Aplt. Br. at
28.

The State agrees that under section 76-5-102.3, a person must be
aware of the victim's status at the time of the assault. But by its own terms,
the statute requires only knowledge of the employee's status, not a specific
intent to assault a school employee based her status as a school employee.
The statute incorporates the offense of assault and adds additional
elements, including the requirement that the offender act with knowledge
of the victim's status:
Any person who assaults an employee of a public or private
school, with knowledge that the individual is an employee, and
when the en1ployee is acting within the scope of his authority
as an e1nployee, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.3 (emphasis added). By its plain tenns, then, the
statute only required the State to prove that W.E.M. knew that Zimmerman
was a school employee.

It did not require the State to prove that he

assaulted her because of her status as a school employee.
In arguing that the State was required to prove that he intentionally
targeted or directed his action toward a school employee, W .E.M. seems to
present a binary choice between intentional targeting and strict liability.
Aplt. Br. at 23-24 (equating the prosecutor's argument as advocating for
strict liability when she argued that the statute does not require the actor to
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specifically target a school employee). This argu1nent depends on a false
dichotomy, that assault of a school e1nployee 1nust be a strict liability
crime-one that requires no mental state at all- if the State does not have to
prove that W.E.M. assaulted Zimmerman for the purpose of assaulting a
school employee. But Utah law recognizes lesser mental states. The one
expressly adopted by the assault-of-a-school-employee statute is "with
knowledge." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.3. That required the State to prove
only that W.E.M. was "aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances ... [or] that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause [a
particular]

result."

knowledge").

Id.

§ 76-2-103(2)

(West 2015)

(defining "with

Because the State had to prove that W.E.M. was at least

aware that his victim was a school employee, it imposed a mental state
requirement; consequently, it was not a sh·ict liability crime. Imposing an
even higher mental state would "do violence" to the statute's plain
language. Cf Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594 (1989).
Further, W.E.M.' s argu1nent for a heightened mental state rests on a
misconception of the statute's effect. He argues that the Court must read
into the statute an intent to assault a school employee based on her status as
a school employee because, he says, the statute creates special privileges for
school employees. He is wrong. A "privilege" is a "special legal right,
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exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons." Black's
Law Dictionary 1234 (8th ed. 2004). As such, it "grants son1eone the legal
freedmn to do or not to do a given act" and "hnmunizes conduct that, under
ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability."

Id.

And

"special privilege" is a term of art, referring to " [a] privilege granted to a
person or class of persons to the exclusion of others and in derogation of the

common right." Id. at 1235 (emphasis added). The cases W.E.M. cites reflect
that specialized definition. See, e.g., Moran v. Miami City Comm'rs, 67 U.S.
722, 722-24 (1862) (examining a legislative charter that gave railroad
company the special privilege of having counties raise public funds on its
behalf); see also Rice v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 66 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1861)
(examining a legislative charter that gave railroad company the special
privilege of exercising the territory's power of eminent domain).
Here, the legislature plainly intended to provide special protection to
those who provide a critical public service in educating youth. The statute
accomplishes its aim by increasing the penalty when someone commits an
assault knowing that his victim is a school employee. Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102(2), with id. § 76-5-102.3(2).
But the statute grants no special rights to school employees to do
·'Vii}

things that others would not be allowed to do. Thus, not only is the special-
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privilege rule inapplicable, but the statute's purpose of protecting school
employees is best served not by ratcheting up the required 1nental state, but
by adhering to the plain language of the text. 5
C. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that
W.E.M. knew he was assaulting a school employee.
W.E.M. argues that he did not know whom he hit until after the fact,
and that he therefore lacked the requisite mental state to be adjudicated as
having assaulted a school employee. Aplt. Br. at 20-25. The State presented
sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's contrary conclusion.
W.E.M. does not dispute that he knew prior to the incident that

5

W.E.M. also argues that, under the doch·ine of transferred intent,
W.E.M.' s intent to hit other students cannot be used as a substitute for
intent to hit a school employee. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. W.E.M.'s transferredintent argument is correct, but beside the point. Under Utah law, intent
transfers from one victim to another, but not from one offense to another.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105 (West 2015) ("Where intentionally causing a
result is an element of an offense, that element is established even if a
different person than the actor intended was killed, injured, or harmed, or
different property than the actor intended was damaged or otherwise
affected."); State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 730-31 (Utah 1984) (rejecting the
argument that the mental state for a lesser offense could satisfy the distinct
mental state for a more serious offense), superseded by statute on other grounds
as recognized in State v. Jimenez, 2012 UT 41, 'lJ 9 n.5, 284 P.3d 640. But the
State does not rely on W.E.M.' s intent to shoulder check other students to
establish his mental state for assault of a school employee. Rather, the State
asserts that he acted with knowledge that he was shoulder checking a
school employee. And as described below, the evidence of that mental state
was sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's adjudication.
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Zimmerman was a school employee. R56:15-16. So it is beyond dispute
that if he knew he was shoulder checking Zimmerman, he knew he was
assaulting a school employee. 6
The juvenile court had sufficient evidence from which it could
reasonably infer that W.E.M. knew he was shoulder checking Zimmerman
because there was evidence from which it could infer that he saw
Zimmerman before he shoulder checked her:

The two were walking

opposite directions down the same hall, facing each other; they had the
opportunity to see each other before W.E.M. lowered his shoulder; and
Zimmerman implied that she in fact saw W.E.M. before he lowered his
shoulder. R56:10-12, 35.

6

W.E.M. asserts in his statement of the issues that the juvenile court
concluded that W.E.M. had the requisite mental state simply because he
knew prior to the incident that Zimmerman was a school employee. Aplt.
Br. at 1. W.E.M. forfeited that argument by failing to discuss it in the
argument section of his brief. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Gorostieta v.
Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ilil 43-44, 17 P.3d 1110. Regardless, nothing in the
record supports that reading. The juvenile court acknowledged that W.E.M.
knew who Zimmerman was because of his prior dealings with her, but it
never stated that those prior dealings alone sufficed to establish the
requisite mental state. R56:116-17. W.E.M. points to nothing that would
overcome the "presumption of regularity" that attaches to trial court
proceedings and findings. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ,I 21, 147 P.3d
448.
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W.E.M. has not shown otherwise. According to W.E.M., Zimmerman
testified that "she had been coming around the corner" "immediately before
the incident."

Aplt. Br. at 22 (emphasis added). In fact, Zimmerman

testified that she "d[id]n' t know how long" after she rounded the corner
that W.E.M. shoulder checked her. R56:12.
He also asserts that Zimmerman herself did not know who shoulder
checked her "until after the incident" and "had to look back to see who did
it.'~ Aplt. Br. at 22. But Zimmerman's testimony actually implies that she
did see W.E.M. before he shoulder checked her. She testified explicitly that

she did not see K.J., R56:17, but regarding W.E.M., she stated, "W was

walking tmvards me and when we passed he ducked his shoulder down and
shoulder bumped into me." R56:10 (emphasis added). The juvenile court
could reasonably interpret that statement to mean that Zimmerman did see
W.E.M. even before he lowered his shoulder.
When asked how soon before W.E.M. shoulder checked her she had
seen him lowering his shoulder, she responded, "Just when he did it"; "It
was all one act"; "It was all one motion." R56:14-15. But that does not
mean that she did not see him before he lowered his shoulder. Zimmerman
stated that after W.E.M. shoulder checked her, she "looked back to make sure

[she] knew who did that and saw W and his friend walking."
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R56:11

(emphasis added). While the juvenile court could have interpreted that
statement to mean that Zhn1nern1an had not noticed who had shoulder
checked her and had to turn around to find out, the court also could have
reasonably concluded that, given the totality of the testimony, Zimmerman
had noticed W.E.M. walking toward her, had seen hhn lower his shoulder
and shoulder check her as they passed, and then had turned around to make

sure it was who she thought it was-as any reasonable school administrator
would do.

And given that reasonable reading of the evidence,

Zimmerman's testimony provided a basis to infer that W.E.M. also had the
opportunity to see her approaching before he lowered his shoulder and
shoulder checked her.
The record contains a surveillance video showing B-Hall at the time
of the assault. The assault itself is not visible due to the poor quality of the
image and the number of students in the hall, nor is W.E.M. or K.J. readily
identifiable. Ex4:File2. But the video establishes a window of opportunity
in which W.E.M. could have seen Zimmerman before the assault. The video

suggests two points at which the assault may have occurred. First, although
Zimmerman is not visible until she appears half-way down the hall, the
teacher with who1n she was patrolling the halls appears, at the 7:32:14 mark,
near the top of the screen, just having rounded the corner from C-Hall to B-
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Hall. Ex4:File2; R56:22, 49 (describing Zhnmerman as wearing black and
white, walking with a male teacher wearing red).

That teacher pauses

moments later, roughly from the 7:32:17 to the 7:32:20 mark, which presents
the first possible moment of the assault. Ex4:File2. Second, in the middle of
the hall, immediately after Zim1nerman first becomes visible on the screen,
Zimmerman turns around to look behind her, at the 7:32:26 mark, which
presents the second possible moment of the assault. Ex4:File2. W.E.M. thus
may have had as much as twelve seconds in which he and Zimmerman
were facing each other, from 7:32:14, when Zimmerman likely entered the
hall, to 7:32:26, when she turned around to make sure she knew who hit her.
Further, on multiple prior occasions, W.E.M. had done the same thing
with and to his friends, and the objective of the behavior was clear: push
one of your friends into someone else. R56:27-28. Regardless of whether
the intended targets were other friends or strangers, it is natural that
whoever is being pushed would look to see whom they were going to
shoulder check.
Circumstantial evidence can - indeed, often must- furnish proof of
the requisite mental state. State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37,
1058; In re J.S., 2012 UT App 340,

,r 5, 292 P.3d 709.

,r 15 n.3, 305 P.3d

And the totality of the

circumstantial evidence here supports the trial court's finding that W.E.M.
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knew he was shoulder checking Zimmerman.

Furthermore, while the

juvenile court could have believed W.E.M.' s testimony that he did not see
Zimmerman until he hit her, R56:65, it hnplicitly rejected that testimony.
Such credibility determinations are accorded significant deference. Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a) ("[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."); see also State v. Morris, 2011
UT 40,

,r 28,

259 P.3d 116 (deferring to a trial court's implicit credibility

determination); R.B. v. L.B., 2014 UT App 270,

,r,r 31-32,

339 P.3d 137

(same). And as shown, there was sufficient evidence from which the court
could conclude that W.E.M. had the opportunity to see that he was shoulder
checking Zimmerman.

Therefore, the court's rejection of W.E.M.'s

testhnony that he did not see Zimmerman was neither unreasonable nor
against the clear weight of the evidence. 7
W.E.M. correctly notes that a trial court's determination should be
given less deference than a jury's. Aplt. Br. at 30-31. See State v. Goodman,
7

K.J.'s testimony does not exclude the possibility that W.E.M. could
have seen Zhnmerman before he shoulder checked her. K.J. testified that he
did not target Zimmerman and he did not see her before he pushed W.E.M.
R56:34, 40. But that testim.ony says nothing about the opportunity to see
Zimmerman, whether W.E.M. in fact saw Zim1nerman, or whether K.J. or
W.E.M. saw or could have seen Zimmerman after K.J. pushed W.E.M., but
before W.E.M. lowered his shoulder and shoulder checked her.
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763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
But the point can be overstated. While a trial court's adjudication or verdict
is given less deference than a jury's, it is given significantly more deference
than many of a trial court's other rulings. See Gourdin By & Through Close v.

Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational Ass'n (SCERA), 845 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah
1992) ("Had this been a bench trial or a jury verdict [rather than a directed
verdict], we would affirm the result because we would apply a more
deferential standard of review.").

When the parties have had a full

opportunity to present and test the facts below, appellate courts afford great
deference to the determination of the fact finder-judge or jury-due to the
fact finder's ability to hear live testimony, observe witnesses, and determine
credibility first-hand. And the reasons for deference are strengthened in the
case of juvenile courts. See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66,

,r 11,

21 P.3d 680

("[T]he juvenile court in particular is given a wide latitude of discretion as
to the judgments arrived at based upon not only the court's opportunity to
judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the juvenile court judges'
special training, experience and interest in this field, and ... qevot[ed] ...
attention to such matters .... " (internal quotation marks omitted) (second
alteration and omissions in original)).
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Thus, in In re Z.D., the supreme court declared that the lesser degree
of deference a trial court is given should inform but not supplant the
application of the clear-error standard. 2006 UT 54, 'if 'if 21-23, 26-27. The
court cautioned that in determining whether a finding is against the clear
weight of the evidence, an appellate court should keep "one eye on the
scales and the other fixed firmly on its duty of deference to findings of fact"
and should forbear from "disturbing the close call."

Id. 'if 33 (internal

quotation marks omitted). So even if this case presented a close call, that
call was for the juvenile court to make. The evidence supports the finding
that W.E.M. knew he was assaulting a school employee.
*

*

*

The State provided sufficient evidence from which the juvenile court
could conclude that W.E.M. assaulted a school employee: W.E.M. lowered
his shoulder and crashed into Zimmerman in one fluid motion, W.E.M. had
the opportunity to see Zimmerman before shoulder checking her, and the
objective of W.E.M.' s behavior was to shoulder check others. The juvenile
court could reasonably infer from these facts that W.E.M. acted voluntarily
and with knowledge that he was shoulder checking a school employee-all
that was required under the statute.
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II.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE EVIDENCE
IS
INSUFFICIENT
TO
SUPPORT
W.E.M.'S
ADJUDICATION FOR ASSAULT AGAINST A SCHOOL
EMPLOYEE,
IT
SHOULD
REMAND
WITH
DIRECTIONS TO ENTER AN ADJUDICATION FOR
THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE
ASSAULT.
Even if the Court concludes that the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding of assault against a school employee, the evidence is at
least sufficient to establish that W.E.M. committed a simple assault.
Therefore, in the event that this Court disagrees with the State on the first
point, it should re1nand for the juvenile court to amend the adjudication to
indicate that W.E.M. com1nitted assault. Cf In re L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 130
(Utah 1982) (amending juvenile court's adjudication because evidence was
sufficient to support lesser-included offense but not the greater).
Assault is a lesser-included offense of assault against a school
e1nployee. An offense is considered a lesser-included offense when "[i]t is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the c01nn1ission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402 (West 2015); see also In re L.G. W., 641 P.2d at 130 (applying the lesserincluded-offense analysis to juvenile court cases because, "[i]f proof fails on
any particular element, there is no lack of notice or other unfairness in a
finding that the juvenile has violated a lesser included offense consisting
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entirely of some remaining elements of the offense or act charged in the
complaint").

Because the statute criminalizing assault against a school

employee incorporates assault as one of its elements, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102.3(1), assault will necessarily be established by "the same or less

than all the facts required to establish the com1nission of" assault against a
school employee, id. § 76-1-402.
The evidence is sufficient here to establish that, if W.E.M. did not
know he was shoulder checking a school employee, he still committed an
assault The assault statute provides several variants by which a person can
commit the offense. 8 Relevant here, the statute states that assault is "an act,

8

When W.E.M. shoulder checked Zimmerman, the assault statute
provided as follows:
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another;
or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has know ledge of
the pregnancy.
(... continued on next page)
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committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." Id. § 76-5102(1) (West 2004). Because the statute does not specify a mental state, the

default minimum mental state of recklessness applies. Id. § 76-2-102 (West
2015). A person acts recklessly "with respect to circumstances surrounding

his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur." Id. § 76-2-103(3). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of
such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id.
By his own admission, W.E.M. acted recklessly. He repeatedly
shoulder checked persons in the crowded halls of his school. His actions
not only had the potential to lead to bodily injury, but did.

W.E.M.

acknowledged that he was aware that other people could get hurt as a result
of his actions. R56:72-73, 75. But even after being warned by an assistant

(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused
serious bodily injury to another.
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102 (West 2004). The legislature has since amended
the statute to re1nove "threat" as a variant of the offense. See id. (West 2015).
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principal, W.E.M. continued shoulder checking. R56:99-100. Thus, W.E.M.
was at least aware of the risk that his actions "create[ d] a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another." Id. § 76-5-102(1). And as shown above, W.E.M.'s
lowering of his shoulder when he was pushed demonstrates that W.E.M.
was a voluntary participant and not a hapless victim.

Having been

forewarned, W.E.M.' s actions constituted a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in that situation.
The evidence is thus more than sufficient to establish the lesser-included
offense of simple assault.
III.

W.E.M.'S DISAGREEMENT WITH THE DECISION TO
REFER HIS CASE TO JUVENILE COURT DOES NOT
PROVIDE A BASIS FOR RELIEF.
W.E.M. argues that his case should never have been referred to
juvenile court. Aplt. Br. at 31-34. Of course, W.E.M. could have avoided
the referral altogether by complying with the directives to cease assaulting
persons in the school hallway.
But once W.E.M. chose to continue his assaults, the choice of whether
he should be referred to juvenile court no longer belonged to him. Rather,
the law gives that choice to others.

When a juvenile is arrested for an

offense that would be a class A misde1neanor or greater if committed by an
adult, the statute requires the peace officer to make a fonnal referral to the
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juvenile court. Utah Code Am1. § 78A-6-602(2)(a) (West Supp. 2015). It is
not clear whether W.E.M. was arrested. But even in situations not involving
arrest for a class A misdemeanor or greater, referral is left to the discretion
of the peace officer or any other person with reason to believe that a minor
has committed an act that would bring him within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction. See id. § 78A-6-602(2)(a), (4)(a); Utah R. Juv. P. 14(a)(l). The
juvenile court's probation deparhnent then makes a preliminary inquiry "to
determine whether the interests of the public or of the minor require that
further action be taken." Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-602(2)(b); Utah R. Juv. P.
14(a).

If so, either the probation deparhnent or the county or district

attorney are given discretion to file a petition seeking an adjudication fr01n
the juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-602(2)(c); Utah R. Juv. P.
14(a); cf. State v. Mahi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995) (stating in the criminal
context that whether to file charges and which charges to file are, within
certain constitutional limits, decisions left to the discretion of the prosecutor
(citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). The juvenile court
then has authority to adjudicate whether the minor "violated any federal,
state, or local law or municipal ordinance" - thus bringing him within the
jurisdiction of the court- and to decide the appropriate disposition upon a
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finding that he had. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-103(1)(a), -117(1)(a), -117(2)
(West Supp. 2015).
W.E.M. does not argue that there was any procedural misstep that
deprived the juvenile court of authority to adjudicate him. He merely asks
the Court to override the decision to adjudicate him based on his belief that
his conduct was not serious enough to warrant the adjudication. But again,
once W.E.M. chose to assault someone, the choice whether to refer him for
an adjudication no longer belonged to him.
W.E.M. has not shown otherwise. He cites no Utah law to establish
that his referral was an abuse of discretion.

Rather he relies on a

concurrence in a Tenth Circuit order. But a single judge's view frmn a court
whose decisions are not controlling is not a basis to override legislative
policy and the discretion of either law enforcement or State's counsel.
Furthermore, the concurring opinion has no persuasive force. In it,
Judge Lucero criticizes Utah's juvenile justice system, but he founds the
criticism on a misapprehension of that system.

Judge Lucero refers

repeatedly to Utah's juvenile justice syste1n as if it were "a criminal law
system'' and criticizes it for treating juveniles "as if they were hardened
criminals and with a lack of finesse." Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d
1243, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., concurring).
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But in truth, "[t]he State, through its juvenile justice system, responds
to delinquent children more as a concerned parent rather than as an
avenging angel." Paul Wake, Helping Children through the Juvenile Justice

System: A Guide for Utah Defense Attorneys, 15 BYU

J.

Pub. L. 31, 32-33

(2000). With limited exceptions, juvenile court delinquency proceedings are
"civil proceedings with the court exercising equitable powers," and
adjudication that a minor is within the court's jurisdiction "is not
considered a conviction of a crime." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116(1), (2)
(West Supp. 2015).

Furthermore, the juvenile justice system is more

"informal and flexible" than the criminal law syste1n. In re L. G. W, 641 P.2d
at 129. That flexibility allows the juvenile court to approach each case with
finesse in order to achieve the purposes of "community protection,
competency development on the part of the child, and accountability to
victims." Wake, Helping Children through the Juvenile Justice System, 15 BYU

J.

Pub. L. at 33; see also Utah Code Aim. § 78A-6-102(5) (West 2009)

(identifying the statutory purposes of the juvenile justice system); In re
L.G.W., 641 P.2d at 129 (noting the aims of the juvenile courts in fostering
accountability and ensuring fair procedures and just results). 9

9

Furthennore, regardless of whether other states' juvenile justice
(... continued on next page)
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That is what happened here.

The juvenile court recognized that

W.E.M. 1nay not have acted with the purpose of harming Zimmerman, but
he had committed an offense nonetheless, and the evidence is sufficient to
support that conclusion. In order to foster accountability on W.E.M.'s part,
but recognizing that under the facts of this case, W.E.M. had not committed
a particularly grievous offense, the juvenile court ordered W.E.M. to
perform only twenty hours of compensatory service, imposed a suspended
five-day term of detention, and ordered him to write a letter of apology to
Zimmerman. R51-52.
Therefore, W.E.M.' s policy arguments are unfounded and lack any
cognizable basis for relief.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. In the alternative,
it should remand for enh·y of an adjudication of assault.

systems have created a "school-to-prison pipeline," Hawker, 774 F.3d at 1245
(Lucero, J., concurring), Utah's system has not. "Most children who come to
juvenile court don't come back more than once, if at all." Wake, Helping
Children through the Juvenile Justice System, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. at 49 & n.82
(presenting statistics on Utah's juvenile justice system).
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Addendum.A

Addendum A

76-2-103. Definitions.

A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

76-5-102. Assault -- Penalties.

(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has know ledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.

·Vil

76-5-102.3. Assault against school employees.

(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or private school, with
knowledge that the individual is an employee, and when the employee is
acting within the scope of his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(2) As used in this section," employee" includes a volunteer.

